UDC: 167.7
https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2025-6-176


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THE NATURE OF REALITY IN REALISTIC AND ANTIREALISTIC CONCEPTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

A. V. Yakimenko
Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Saint-Petersburg, Russia
e-mail: yakimen81@mail.ru

Abstract. The paper examines the controversy between representatives of realism and anti-realism regarding the status of theoretical knowledge in science, reflecting the «eternal» theme of ontological-epistemological philosophical problems. The essence of the dispute is as follows: should scientific theories be considered exclusively as tools that help scientists find new empirical patterns, or are there grounds to believe that theories are capable of reflecting some hidden reality inaccessible to direct observation.

The purpose of the research is the question of the nature of theoretical knowledge in science. To achieve this goal, a systematic and comparative analysis of descriptive and explanatory approaches to scientific knowledge in the teachings of Pierre Duhem and David Deutsch, the concepts of manipulative and virtual realism by Jan Hacking and David Chalmers was carried out. As well as analysis of the degree of compliance with these concepts of the manipulative criterion of reality as the possibility of a responsive influence of the cognizable entity.

The author of this article proposes to examine the debate between realists and antirealists using a historical and philosophical analysis of key aspects of the dispute (Duhem’s descriptive approach and Deutsch’s explanatory function of scientific theory); and, relying on the comprativist method, to clarify the epistemic status of cognizable objects in these approaches.

The scientific novelty of the research consists in the analysis of a new criterion of reality, experimental or manipulative as a response factor. According to this criterion, we can talk about the reality of abstract non-physical entities (for example, in mathematics, the role of experiment and observation is played by proof) and interactive virtual reality.

The theoretical significance of the research lies in the development of an integrated approach based on the epistemic thesis of scientific realism in the spirit of the metaphysics of ideal concepts, which is important in the context of modern discussions about the nature of scientific knowledge, which forms the scientific picture of the world and describes reality.

The obtained results allow us to explore ways of overcoming the extreme positions of realistic and anti-realistic approaches in the analysis of scientific knowledge.

Key words: scientific theory, reality, manipulative realism, virtual realism, antirealism, descriptivism, instrumentalism, criterion of reality, experiment.

Cite as: Yakimenko, A. V. (2025) [The nature of reality in realistic and antirealistic concepts of the philosophy of science]. Intellekt. Innovacii. Investicii [Intellect. Innovations. Investments]. Vol. 6, pp. 176–186. – https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2025-6-176.


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