THOUGHT AS A QUASI-POSSIBILITY
D. V. Ankin
Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B. N. Yeltsin, Yekaterinburg, Russia
e-mail: dmitryankin@gmail.com
Abstract. Modal logic determines a lot in modern metaphysics and ontology, which delve deeper and deeper into the realm of the possible, not limited to the analysis of reality. This makes it relevant to study the problems of philosophical argumentation, built on the basis of modal logic.
The aim of the work is to prove that thinkability does not necessarily entail a logical possibility. Because of this, many kinds of modal arguments that involve inference from conceivability to possibility can be flawed.
Methodology: the author considers the question of the existence of objects impossible from the point of view of classical logical omniscience as a parallel to the idea of the existence of impossible possible worlds by J. Hintikka.
The main idea of this article is the assertion that the gap between conceivability and possibility is generated by the intellectual limitations of the epistemic agent. The agent consistently — within the framework of the information available to him, and not in the absolute sense - considers logically possible that which is logically impossible from the point of view of logical omniscience. It turns out that we are able to think not only of something non-existent (to have empty intentions), but even quite capable of thinking the logically impossible. The conceivability of the impossible is somewhat analogous to the conceivability of impossible objects that are constructed by contemporary artists.
The paper draws a parallel between the tautological thinkability of such an equation that is not tautological and the thinkability as a theorem of something that is not a theorem (S. Kripke’s modal arguments).
As a particular example, the author criticizes the argument of the zombie by D. Chalmers, which is popular in modern philosophy of consciousness. It is shown that the conceivability of a zombie does not exclude the possible inconsistency of a zombie from an absolute point of view.
In the second part, various types of the a priori are also considered, the opposition is built between the classical idea of logical omniscience and the agent-based approach using the categories of semantics of possible worlds.
The main result of the proposed work is to prove that both formally contradictory and conceptually contradictory can be outside the framework of the epistemic attainability of the final agent. The author introduces a new philosophical category of the quasi-possible.
Key words: conceivability and possibility, impossible possible worlds, zombie argument, epistemological agent, logical omniscience, conceptual a priori, quasi-possible.
Cite as: Ankin, D. V. (2021) [Thought as a quasi-possibility]. Intellekt. Innovatsii. Investitsii [Intellect. Innovations. Investments]. Vol. 6, pp. 106–114. DOI: 10.25198/2077-7175-2021-6-106.
