UDC: 101.3:316.64
https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2024-3-89
EDN: IAQRIH


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UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM: PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RESEARCHING OF CONSPIRACY BELIEFS

A. V. Dumov
State Academic University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: avdumov@inbox.ru

V. I. Kudashov
Prof. V.F. Voino-Yasenetsky Krasnoyarsk State Medical University, Krasnoyarsk, Russia
e-mail: vkudashov@mail.ru

Abstract. In this article, the authors review current philosophical discussions about the essence and specific features of conspiracy beliefs, the purpose of which is to formulate its relevant definitions. The parties to the discussion are grouped around two conventionally distinguished positions, designated by the terms «universalism» («generalism») and «particularism» («minimalism»). The purpose of the article is to reveal the content of the philosophical discussion of the question about preferable way to theorize conspiracy beliefs. The purpose of the study determines the choice of comparative analysis as a key method. Particularism and universalism are compared by the authors from the point of view of the views of their representatives on the genesis of the content of conspiracy beliefs, the characteristic mechanisms for justifying such beliefs, and a number of socio-epistemological problems that arise in connection with the study of conspiracy beliefs. Based on the comparative analysis carried out, the authors draw conclusions about the adequacy of the very distinction between theoretical positions in the discussion of conspiracy theories using the dichotomy «universalism – particularism». The novelty of the presented conclusions lies not only in highlighting the content of philosophical discussions around the issues of theorization of conspiracy beliefs, but also in the critical analysis of ideas about the opposition of particularism and universalism. The practical significance of the study is to identify the limitations of the conceptual apparatus used to discuss the philosophical reflection of conspiracy beliefs.

Key words: conspiracy belief, particularism, universalism, social epistemology, definition of conspiracy theory, conspiracy, determining factors of conspiracy thinking.

Cite as: Dumov, A. V., Kudashov, V. I. (2024) [Universalism and particularism: philosophical discussions about researching of conspiracy beliefs]. Intellekt. Innovacii. Investicii [Intellect. Innovations. Investments]. Vol. 3, pp. 89– 97. – https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2024-3-89.


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