UDC: 165.0
https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2026-1-140
EDN: OAWPOS


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ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF L. ZAGZEBSKI’S RESULTS FOR SOLVING THE GETTIER PROBLEM

R. A. Yartsev
Ufa University of Science and Technology, Ufa, Russia
e-mail: rust-66@yandex.ru

Abstract. The article is devoted to the analysis of the authoritative research results of L. Zagzebski on the Gettier problem, which has not been solved for many years. The purpose of the analysis is to verify these results and establish their significance for solving the problem in the philosophy of science.

Based on the developed concept of rational skepticism, L. Zagzebski’s conclusion about the independence between the ideal of absolutely reliable truth in cognition and relatively reliable truth, which is actually justified by the cognizing subject, is confirmed. At the same time, for the first time, a number of errors made by the author are discovered and it is shown that their elimination can lead to a successful solution to the problem under consideration.

Thus, L. Zagzebski, along with other researchers, does not specify that this problem arises only for rational cognitive practices, the norms of which require a logical justification of the truth and that concepts based on externalism do not support science with its internalism. The well-known formulation of the problem is externalistic: the discrepancy between truth and justification in Gettier’s cases is demonstrated not by the cognitive activity of another subject, but by a declaration of the external state of affairs. Therefore, L.’s conclusion does not apply to the internalist philosophy of science. Zagzebski says that the problem applies to any concepts that define knowledge as true faith plus «something else».

It is shown that rational skepticism justifies an internalist revision of scientific knowledge, in which the justification of truth is «something else» that is necessary and sufficient to establish knowledge. This way of solving the problem, which eliminates the independence between truth and justification by rejecting the externalist understanding of truth, is mistakenly rejected by L. Zagzebski, who opposes the internalist principle «S reasonably believes that P”entails P»: however, her objections to R. Almeder are refuted by clarifying the scientific cognitive practice for which the problem is being solved. The author also does not identify a popular but erroneous solution, which consists in adding an externalistic condition to the justification, which, due to its unverifiability, turns any solution into useless formalism: these are, as it seems, the conditions for the absence of possible refutations, an objective virtuous «act» and a compatible binding.

It is recommended to avoid the identified errors in further research on the Gettier problem.

Key words: truth, justification, knowledge, revision, externalism, internalism, rational skepticism, Gettier, Zagzebski.

Cite as: Yartsev, R. A. (2026) [On the significance of L. Zagzebski’s results for solving the Gettier problem]. Intellekt. Innovacii. Investicii [Intellect. Innovations. Investments]. Vol. 1, pp. 140 –150. – https://doi.org/10.25198/2077-7175-2026-1-140.


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